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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: 
APPRECIATING THE NUANCE AND COMPLEXITY 
OF LEGAL SYSTEMS WITH A BASIS IN RELIGION 
 
Massimo Campanini† & Mohamed ‘Arafa* 
 
A Note from the Author 
 
My friend and co-author, Massimo Campanini, passed away on October 
9th, 2020, while this article was being prepared for publication. He left behind a 
lovely wife, Donatella, a son, Emmanuelle, and more than forty books that defined 
the modern study of Islam. His death made national headlines in Italy and was a 
great blow to me. I first knew Massimo through his brilliant work. Then I came to 
know him personally. I was surprised when an author of his stature suggested that 
we write a book of political theory together and felt honored when he spoke of my 
insights as “fine and precise.” The fruit of that collaboration ultimately became 
the work you see here.  
Campanini was an aristocrat who walked with academic Kings, but he 
never lost the common touch. His allure, charisma, and sense of humor were 
delightful. His soul was generous and compassionate; he was a supreme speaker 
of many languages; an inspiring teacher; an extraordinary storyteller; and a man 
of encyclopedic knowledge. Farewell, my friend! Grazie, a presto!  
          
         -Mo 
 
Introduction 
It is tempting to look at Muslim-majority countries today and conclude that Islam impedes 
democracy, yet few people seriously consider what (if any) aspect of Islam could cause such a 
phenomenon. Even those who do ask assume that something about Islam itself is the problem.1 
Granted, the data does not inspire one to think otherwise. Out of 42 Muslim-majority countries 
ranked in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), only five are classified as democracies. Another 
 
†Massimo Campanini (1954-2020) was a Professor of Humanities at the University of Trento. 
*Assistant Professor of Law Alexandria University (Egypt); Visiting Adjunct Professor of Law Cornell Law School 
and Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law (Indianapolis). S.J.D., 2013, Indiana University Robert 
H. McKinley School of Law; LL.M., 2008, University of Connecticut School of Law; LL.B., 2006, Alexandria 
University. The author extends his appreciation to the Barry Law Review editorial team, especially Michael 
Hristakopoulos, for their substantial edits and efforts that made this paper possible. 
1 Mohammed Fadel, Political Legitimacy, Democracy and Islamic Law: The Place of Self‐Government in Islamic 
Political Thought, 2 J. ISLAMIC ETHICS 59, 59 (2018) (“Contemporary Political Islam, or Islamism, is commonly 
defined as a movement that seeks to apply the Sharīʿa as the basic law of Muslim states. This suggests that political 
legitimacy in Islamic thought can be reduced to the conformity of a polity’s actions to a pre-determined body of rules 
that are supplied by revelation, as supplemented by the interpretations of jurists. Such a demand is reasonably 
understood to be non-democratic because it includes no room for self-government by making it either redundant, if it 
produces results that are in conformity with the norms of the Sharīʿa, or contradictory to self-government, if the results 
of self-government differ from revealed norms.”). 
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14 are “hybrid regimes,” and the remaining 24 “authoritarian.”2 When the correlation between the 
religion of a country and its democracy is so low, it can be difficult not to infer causation.3 But, is 
Islam truly a deterrent to democracy, or is something else at play? This article argues that, while 
Islam is not incompatible with democracy, the picture is complex in practice. Rather than focusing 
on how countries apply Shari’a (Islamic law)4 in democratic contexts, this article examines how 
the theory of democracy interacts with the Muslim world.5 Focusing narrowly on arguments and 
observations from legal and political scholars, we seek a different perspective on why democracy 
faces challenges in Muslim-majority countries.6 
For all the optimistic scholarship asserting that Islam is indeed compatible with democracy, 
only Tunisia has managed to survive the Arab Spring.7 Other scholars have written extensively on 
the successes and failures of the Arab Spring, and we do not re-litigate those arguments.8 Rather, 
we start with the assumption that this is not the case at all.9 If anything, the relationship is one of 
indifference. Additionally, instead of hypothesizing how Islamic institutions will have to adapt to 
democracy—which we will assume they do not—it is crucial to put democracy into its proper 
context, as one among many forms of government, none being more compatible with Islam than 
the other. Islam and ijtihad (individual reasoning) developed for compatibility with the Caliphate 
(leadership), which is as much an anti-government as it is a government.10 In a religion that is 
theoretically opposed to any government where people create law, government is an inconvenient 
fact of life rather than an affirmative concern.11 The only just government in Islam is one that 
 
2 It should be noted that EIU does not rank Western Sahara, Maldives, Comoros, Mayotte, Kosovo, Cocos, or 
Brunei. See, e.g., THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2019: A YEAR OF DEMOCRATIC 
SETBACKS AND POPULAR PROTESTS at 10-14 (2019), https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index 
[http://perma.cc/34DC-U27G].  
3 Fadel, supra note 1, at 63 (“The egalitarian and inclusive theological positions of Sunnism, however, generated 
certain problems for the legitimacy of political ordering. If all persons were substantially equal, morally and 
intellectually, Sunnī religious doctrine could not provide an obvious answer to the question of who should assume the 
mantle of political leadership.”).  
4 Properly, however, shari‘a (meaning “way,” “road to …”) is only the revealed base of Islamic law which is the fiqh. 
5 See generally Mohammed Fadel, Islamic Law Reform: Between Reinterpretation and Democracy, 18 Y. B. ISLAMIC 
& MIDDLE E. L. 44 (2013-2015).  
6 See generally ADAM R. GAISER, MUSLIMS, SCHOLARS, SOLDIERS: THE ORIGIN AND ELABORATION OF THE IBADI 
IMAMATE TRADITIONS (2010).  
7 JOHN L. ESPOSITO, TAMARA SONN & JOHN O. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 3 (2016).  
8 See Id. at 1-4 (discussing successes and failures of the Arab Spring generally).  
9 It should be noted that it is not easy to deal comparatively a religious item (Islam) with a political item (democracy). 
Nobody asks whether Judaism or Christianity are compatible with democracy, whilst the question “Is Islam compatible 
with democracy?” is biased insofar as the answer is expected to be “No.” See generally M.A. MUQTEDAR KHAN ET. 
AL., ISLAMIC DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE: THEORY, DEBATES, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (M.A. Muqtedar 
Khan ed. 2006).   
10 See generally ESPOSITO ET AL., supra note 7 (examining the state of democracy in Muslim-majority societies today. 
Applying a twenty-first century perspective to the question of whether Islam is "compatible" with democracy, they 
redirect the conversation toward a new politics of democracy that transcends both secular authoritarianism and 
Political Islam. [Also, they] raised questions regarding equality, economic justice, democratic participation, and the 
relationship between Islam and democracy in their respective countries. Does democracy require a secular political 
regime? Are religious movements the most effective opponents of authoritarian secularist regimes? [And on] how 
these opposition movements reflect the new global realities of media communication and sources of influence and 
power.). 
11 Id. But see PATRICIA CRONE, MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT (Carole Hillenbrand ed. 2004) (arguing that 
in Islam power is a benefit of God, not the outcome of sin and of the “Fall” as in the so-called “Political Augustinism” 
in Christian Middle Ages); see also MASSIMO CAMPANINI, LA POLITICA NELL’ISLAM, UN’INTERPRETAZIONE 
[POLITICAL ISLAM AND ITS INTERPRETATION] (2019). 
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carries out Islamic law, which is the only truly reliable source of justice.12 Thus, the core argument 
is whether that government is a democracy or not is of secondary importance. Democracy requires 
a commitment to it, and if people believe that their current government carries out Islamic justice, 
then the commitment to democracy will not justify the actions necessary to institute it. 
Today, religions are in a position perhaps not encountered ever in their existence.13 In the 
United States, as well as other areas of the world, there is a sharp decline in the belief in a Creator, 
or at the very least, a decline in the participation in organized religion.14 This has led to a decrease 
in religious education and, in the opinion of the authors, a decrease in the understanding of 
thousands of years of religious doctrine. In the eyes of the general populace, without the many 
years of in-depth studying, complex legal systems developed over hundreds or thousands of years, 
are reduced to backward systems of governance, reliant on an outdated concept of divine 
communication.15 This lack of understanding is perpetuated by numerous statements by high-
ranking officials, policymakers, and lawmakers throughout recent history who frequently share 
this ill-informed view of Islam’s legal framework.16 The reality is indeed something very different. 
Rather, religions like Islam and Judaism, for instance, even by secular standards, have created 
incredibly intricate and complex legal systems over many hundreds of years.17 But with this 
complexity, as well as the variety of scholars studying these works, comes many different opinions 
about how to interpret these ancient words and concepts, as what means one thing to one person 
could mean something entirely different to another.  
At the heart of this debate is a comparison between Judaism and Islam, and how similarities 
can be drawn between the two theologies in order to better understand the “true” Islam. How 
should the text of the Qur’an—and the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammed’s) teachings—and Jewish 
Bible (“Torah”) be viewed and interpreted? While there is a trend, certainly among secularists, to 
 
12 See generally John L. Esposito & James P. Piscatori, Democratization and Islam, 45 MIDDLE EAST J. 427 (1991). 
13 See generally GABRIEL A. ALMOND, R. SCOTT APPLEBY & EMMANUEL SIVAN, STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD (2003); see also GILLES KEPEL, LA RÉVANCHE DE DIEU, CHRÈTIENS, JUIFS 
AND MUSULMANS À LA CONQUETE DU MONDE [THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY AND JUDAISM IN THE 
MODERN WORLD] (Fr. 1991). 
14 Maurits S. Berger, Understanding Sharia in the West, 6 J. L. RELIGION & ST. 236 (2018) (“The main challenge of 
understanding Sharia in the West is its undefined nature. This contradicts the ease with which the term is used in 
public and political discourse, but also in the legal domain, which prides itself on its precision in terminology . . . . [It] 
addresses the question: What is the Sharia that Muslims in the West practice? To this end, a model is presented that 
provides tools to describe the complex interaction between Sharia, as practiced by Western Muslims, and their 
Western environment, and elucidates the ongoing dialectic of this interaction. The model further shows how Western 
Muslims adopt and adapt Sharia by maneuvering between their specific needs in the Western context and the 
conditions set by that context. From a Western perspective, the model shows that issues of Sharia are usually discussed 
in legal terms, while most controversies are not legal but cultural in nature.”). 
15 Id. at 240-43. It should be noted that people in the Middle East often have a greater depth of understanding of 
Christianity and Judaism because it is part of the history and culture, but in the United States, comparatively little is 
known about any of these three Abrahamic religions by many today. 
16 Id. at 245-53 (“[T]he notion of Sharia in the West as (a) a set of Islam-motivated rules (b) practiced by Muslim 
social-legal entities (individuals, communities, organizations) in the West, whereby (c) these Muslims are both the 
defining and the enforcing agency of these rules. The most important conclusion that we can draw from this definition 
is that Sharia is not something “out there;” it is defined by people through their words and actions. Note that this 
definition is not intended to elucidate why Muslims do certain things; it merely determines what they do and how they 
do it.”).  
17 Id. 
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view texts in a simple and more literal way, this may be only one part of the picture.18 What is 
really required instead is a deep and nuanced understanding of these ancient texts, using the 
expertise provided by hundreds of years of study and extrapolation by religious and legal scholars 
from around the world.19 
Accordingly, in section two, this article will discuss the history and overall facts around 
religious interpretation, specifically regarding Islam and Judaism. It will then compare the two 
religions and see where they are similar and where they are dissimilar, by studying a specific 
example of religious interpretation (compare and contrast it with Judaism, another ancient and 
closely related religion). Also, it will discuss the public outlook on such texts and suggest how 
people can better understand the true complexity of these religious tomes.20 Section three will 
cover three arguments. First, there are certain prerequisites to democracy in any country. Putting 
these prerequisites in the context of Islam is important in understanding how Muslim societies 
view the institution of government in the first place. Second, Islam per se is not a bar to democracy, 
but Muslim majority societies prefer a government that the people believe protects the principles 
of Islamic law, namely rule of law and justice. The ideal is the Caliphate, but the alternative in any 
Islamic government is one that the body politic of a country views as promoting those ends. 
Finally, it will conclude that democracy has trouble taking hold in Muslim countries because it is 
a very fragile system, and it is not one that is necessarily compelling to Muslim majority societies 
over an Islamization of what already exists. In short, this paper will delve more deeply into an 
analysis of Islam and its historical evolution through juridical science to conclude that the religion 
is not incompatible with democracy. 
II. Religious and Divine Interpretation: Islam and Judaism 
A. Historical background 
The history of interpretation is one that is difficult to describe succinctly, since there were 
indeed many scholars and religious authorities at various times who each played a part in the goal 
of understanding the texts of the Hebrew Bible and Qur’an.21 What is clear is that throughout 
 
18 John L. Esposito, Tamara Sonn & John O. Voll, In the Middle East, Islamists Are Not the Enemies of Democracy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2015, 2:16 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/middle-east-islamists-
democracy_b_7623660?guccounter= [https://perma.cc/B4KQ-4M4B] (“Islamic activists include both strong 
advocates of democracy and supporters of authoritarian rule. However, that spectrum is similar to the spectrum of 
advocates of secularism. Some of the most brutal authoritarian dictatorships in the Muslim world and elsewhere have 
been secularist in their political ideology . . . . The relationships between Islam and democracy after the Arab Spring 
are complex and changing in important ways. In the late 20th century, much attention was given to the question of 
whether or not Islam and democracy are compatible.”). 
19 Id. (“For the majority of Muslims in the world, the issue is settled. They see no real contradiction between Islam 
and democracy. The major debates are about what forms Muslim democracy can take, with a growing recognition that 
a democratic Muslim state may take many different forms. The real battles and civil conflicts are not between 
advocates of a ‘religious’ state and advocates of a ‘secular’ state.”). 
20 See generally SILVIO FERRARI, LO SPIRITO DEI DIRITTI RELIGIOSI [THE SPIRIT OF THE RELIGIOUS/DIVINE LAW] 
(2001). 
21 Keith Kahn-Harris, How Should We Read Religious Texts? Britain’s Former Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks Advocates 
a More Complex Reading. But do his Ideas Fit with the Modern World?, NEW HUMANIST (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/4943/how-should-we-read-religious-texts (“Is Islam a ‘religion of peace’? Or is 
Islam irredeemably committed to violence? And at the heart of this debate is the status of the Qur’an and other Islamic 
texts: do they really justify the brutality of Al Qaeda, ISIS and other regimes and factions? Is their interpretation of 
Islamic law the authentic one? Ironically, there is a commonality of interest between Islam’s fiercest opponents and 
its fiercest advocates in upholding a vision of the religion that is implacably opposed to everything outside itself.”). It 
 
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol26/iss1/1




history, it has been understood that there is not simply just the literal interpretation of a passage, 
but rather, multiple different methods of exegesis.22 In Judaism, the Talmudic period made up the 
time when the Mishna (200 CE) and the Gemara (500 CE) were created, which are essentially the 
compilation of the opinions of the major rabbis and Jewish philosophers of the time.23 Among 
many interpretation tools at their disposal, there are primarily four broad categories. First, was the 
“peshat” understanding, essentially the “plain, literal meaning of the words within their literary 
context”; the second was “remez” understanding, which indicates a more in-depth and deeper 
comprehension of the text; then the “derash” understanding, which means a legal or “aggadic” 
exposition is necessary; and finally the “sod,” which is the more Kabbalist or mystical 
understanding.24 Utilizing these broad concepts, all with their own sub-categories, Jewish thinkers 
were able to bring clarity to religious scripture.25 
Perhaps one of the most famous cases of religious interpretation (or rather, 
misinterpretation) begins with the phrase first found in Hammurabi’s ancient Babylonian legal 
code, but featured prominently in the Hebrew Bible, “an eye for an eye . . . .”26 This is a famously 
well-known law and is sometimes used to be a representation of the violent, retributive theme of 
the Old Testament.27 Read literally, it certainly seems to indicate the allowance for physical 
violence in order to “get even,” but hundreds of years of oral and written tradition show this not to 
be the case.28 The rabbis of the Talmudic era understood the many layers and levels of 
interpretation and, through years of legal discourse, decided against the “peshat” here.29 
In the Shari’a, such methods have similarly been utilized, as Dr. Bulent Senay, professor 
of Comparative Religion at Uludag University, explains, “[D]iscussion on the interpretation and 
understanding of religion has a long history in the Islamic sciences.”30 He further writes that “at 
the heart of hermeneutics lies a set of systematic, coherent, well-developed set of principles and 
procedures governing textual interpretation of scriptures . . . .”31 Qur’anic Hermeneutics is the field 
 
goes without saying that the same questions could be put forward about Judaism: Biblical books like Deuteronomy, 
for example, are replete with very violent expression, but this does not involve the rhetorical question whether Judaism 
is a religion of peace. All religions are peaceful or warlike in accordance with the political use men make and made 
of them. 
22
 ISAAC KALIMI & PETER J. HAAS, BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY 17-18 (2006). 
23 See generally ISAAC KALIMI, THE RETELLING OF CHRONICLES IN JEWISH TRADITION AND LITERATURE: A 
HISTORICAL JOURNEY (2009).  
24 KALIMI & HASS, supra note 22, at 13. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.   
27 Id. at 14. 
28 Joe M. Sprinkle, How Should the Old Testament Civil Laws Apply Today, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 909, 917 (2008) 
(“Theonomy means literally, ‘law of God’ . . . Theonomy represents a modification of the traditional Reformed 
approach to the law. Theonomists agree with the advocates of the Reformed approach that the ceremonial law is 
superseded under the new covenant but disagree with them over the continued applicability of the civil law.”).  
29
 KALIMI & HASS, supra note 22, at 13-15. It should be noted that while Kalimi takes a more cynical view regarding 
the rabbinical interpretation’s emphasis on things other than the peshat literal reading of the text, he does not dispute 
the fact that the rabbis did indeed diverge strictly from the literal reading. 
30 Bulent Senay, Hermeneutics in Islam in the Midst of Text and Context, EUR MUSLIM NETWORK (Sept. 10, 2008), 
https://eumuslim.net/?s=hermeneutics [https://perma.cc/R7HZ-YK7E] (“Islamic tradition of `humanities` has had the 
discipline of `understanding` for centuries under the name of `usool at-tafseer` [Islamic Interpretation Principles] and 
`usool al-fiqh` [Islamic Jurisprudence] far long before biblical hermeneutics emerged in the west as discipline. 
Although today the subject of different interpretations of religion has largely been taken from modern philosophical 
hermeneutics, it should be noted that the discussion on the interpretation and understanding of religion has a long 
history in the Islamic sciences.”) (emphasis added).  
31 Id.  
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of Islamic legal interpretation and has helped construct the rules by which an Islamic mujtihad 
(thinker) may interpret the text.32 The three dimensions one pays attention to are the ‘illah 
(rational), the matn (text), and the maqsad (purpose); and just like with the Judaic legal thinkers, 
there are many ways to understand a text either through a literal reading or deeper understanding.33 
Further comparisons shed light on the care and thought that went into understanding the 
religious text, specifically regarding hierarchy of authority.34 In both religions there is a main 
source of divine origin, the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’an. Next, Islam has the Sunnah (prophet’s 
teachings) while Judaism has the Mishnah, the compiled teachings of the early Judaic legal rabbis 
during the first half of the Talmudic era (200–500 CE).35 Importantly, both the Sunnah and 
Mishnah are intent on providing elaborations to the original text.36 Ultimately, while not 
necessarily following in exactly the same tradition, the substantial similarities are indicative of the 
foresight and intelligence of the original scholars who developed these hierarchies akin to judicial 
courts (i.e. District courts being the lowest and the Supreme Court of the United States being the 
highest authority—court in the land—to overrule decisions).37 In the same vein, the similarities in 
the way the legal doctrine develops through interpretation have continued to remain similar to this 
very day.  
Both religions have been challenged by younger, more skeptical generations, and the 
carefully established traditions, such as the hierarchy of sources and respect for certain books, have 
eroded somewhat.38 This has come about through the reformation movement’s intent on taking an 
approach that looks to emphasize modern egalitarian values over some of the older traditions, with 
Islam particularly facing significantly more pressure due to extremist interpretations and radical 
understandings that have sullied the name of Islam to many in Western nations.39 
Indeed, a significant amount of Islamic law is subject to legal reasoning and is dependent 
thereon. The foundations for this rests upon restrictions to legal rulings stated in the Qur’anic texts 
and the Sunnah having a definitive nature, and the rest of the legal body of the Shari’a is contingent 
upon the jurists’ ijtihad (legal reasoning).40 This is not at all a shortcoming in the law since the 
lawmaker who set out conclusive legal rulings was certainly able to enforce an exclusively 
definitive law, the application of its legal rulings is not subject to any qiyas (analogical 
 
32 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-making, 1 
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135 (2002). 
33 See generally Nazeem M. Goolam, Ijtihad and Its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation, MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1443 (2006).  
34 Gianluca De Donno, et al., The Role of Shari‘a as a Source of Law: Looking for a Pragmatic Approach, 4 JUSONLINE  
375, 389-91 (Sassari Univ. 2018) (on file with author). 
35 There are also a series of books relating the experiences of prophets during the era of the early Judean Kingdoms, 
but they are not necessarily utilized for legal understanding or textual extrapolation and so are not necessarily an exact 
comparison to the Sunnah. 
36 For example, the Qur’an sets out the requirement to fast by stating “oh you who have believed, decreed upon you 
is fasting” but doesn’t necessarily give many details for how or when this should be accomplished. That is left to the 
prophet, who provide “the means” by which to follow the Qur’an’s teachings. Similarly, the Hebrew Bible commands 
that “Tzitzit” be worn on every four-cornered garment, but it does not necessarily explain for what parts of the days, 
the reason for it, or even what “Tzitzit” are. That is for the oral tradition and discussions of the Rabbis in the Mishnah, 
Gemara, and later commentaries by well-known figures such as Rashi and Rambam (Maimonides), though all are 
always careful to adhere to the hierarchy of authority and not to contradict the earlier sources. 
37
 KALIMI, supra note 23. 
38 BBC One, A Cut Too Far?, YOUTUBE (July 19, 2019), https://youtu.be/AM5hqiV25XA [http://perma.cc/4BD3-
RD5X] (circumcision documentary).   
39 De Donno, supra note 34, at 381.  
40 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 32. 
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deduction).41 However, there have been significant reasons behind this flexible nature of Islamic 
law, as this very nature of Islamic norms has made the law flexible and adjustable to all societies 
and regions (at any given time and place).42 Furthermore, the law has become susceptible to 
developing and adopting different means and methods of change; its development can be shown 
through selecting certain legal interpretations that are more proper than others in addressing the 
legal cases concerned.43 
Progress can be made by generating evolving legal views as novel legal cases arise. This 
aspect explicitly endorses Islamic law legally valid for all legal cases irrespective of time and 
place.44 The importance of the interpretation of the Shari’a does not lie in the different legal views 
held by several scholars concerning a particular legal case; rather it primarily resides in the way in 
which the jurist interprets the law.45 When interpreting a specific Qur’anic verse, for example, the 
mujtihad (jurist thinker) cannot interpret it in isolation. He or she should, nevertheless, consider 
the verse, its legal, contextual, and linguistic frameworks, its occasion of revelation, and all the 
events that surround the revelation thereof (the philosophes beyond the text).46 
In this domain, istiḥsān (juristic preference) is a special legal practice exercised by Islamic 
legal jurists—especially by the Hānāfi school of thought—which falls within the scope of legal 
reasoning.47 It is considered an interpretation made based on a revealed text, though giving rise to 
a different legal outcome from that emerged via qiyas (analogical deduction).48 The key difference 
between analogy and preference lies in the fact that while the analogical reasoning falls 
predominantly within the large body of the law with no exemption permitted, the reasoning behind 
preference is to find a precise exception through the jurist’s choice of a revealed text that allows 
this very exception.49 It is worth noting in this respect that reasoning by preference is based on a 
valid authentic hadith (prophetic tradition) and hence replacing the reasoning by analogy.50 Not 
all preference exceptions are created on revealed texts, some of which are based on ijma’a 
(consensus of the scholars), while others are based on the darourah (principle of necessity).51 On 
the other hand, istiṣlāḥ (public interest) is another legal practice—adopted mainly by the Mālki 
jurisprudence—which is controlled within legal reasoning. The reasoning of public interest does 
not seem to be founded on the Qur’an. Public interest (common benefit), yet, plays an irrefutably 
critical role in the determination of the ratio’s appropriateness peculiar to analogy.52 Accordingly, 
 
41 Goolam, supra note 33. 
42 Id. 
43 De Donno, supra note 34. 
44 See generally Khizr Muazzam Khan, Juristic Classification of Islamic Law, 6 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 23 (1983) (defining 
the primary and the secondary sources of Islamic law). 
45 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 57 (2002) 
(noting the different sources of Islamic law and the meaning of the public interest’s interpretation). 
46 Id. In other words, a legal text never stands on its own according to Islamic legal system, but it is—with no doubt—
influenced by a various of events that support the jurist to infer the most suitable legal ruling for the legal case in 
question. Consequently, elements of coherence and intertextuality are of chief significance and should always be in 
the jurist’s mind during the interpretation process of the legal provisions. 
47 Khan, supra note 44. 
48 Id. Thus, “alIstihsan” (equality, in the West) is the idea that more importance must be placed on modern concepts 
of justice and “goodness,” rather than the strict adherence to previous generation’s interpretations. 
49 Goolam, supra note 33. 
50 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 32. 
51 Id.  
52 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 45. 
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if the feature of public interest in a case is in line with these general principles, the reasoning is to 
be in accordance with the public’s interest and must be exercised in this manner.53 
B. Interpretation: Stoning as the Death Penalty 
Much of the frustration with the traditional interpretations of religious capital punishments 
is the lack of necessary understanding of the text. According to polling released in October 2018, 
public opinion of the death penalty in the United States has fallen to a 45-year low.54 Many of the 
theories for the death penalty, such as retributive and deterrence effects, have been challenged by 
social scientists, who make the claim that the death penalty does not sufficiently accomplish these 
goals to justify continued executions.55 Therefore, when the casual reader finds quotes in the 
Qur’an or the Hebrew Bible, and they read it with the peshat or literal interpretation with little to 
no context, they understandably grow concerned.56 In some cases, this is even perpetrated by the 
extremist groups who act on these less nuanced interpretations and create animosity worldwide.57 
An obvious example in that regard is riddāā (apostasy), which is by no means sanctioned in the 
Qur’an, but subsequently developed through distorted jurisprudence. 
Capital punishment is indeed one of the more complex legal issues in Judaism and Islam, and it 
requires an in-depth understanding as to why it exists and under what circumstances one can move 
forward with the punishment.58 For the most part, Judaism and Islam appear to treat the 
requirements similarly, insofar as the punishment of stoning is for the most part, a symbolic 
punishment.59 First, the origin of stoning in Islam does not come from the Qur’an, but rather, from 
the Hadiths.60 Second, as Dr. Jonathan Brown, Chair of Islamic Civilization at Georgetown 
University, explains, jurists at the time created significant boundaries in order to ensure that capital 
 
53 Id. This robust connection between the ratio and suitability has caused in considering public interest by some jurists 
an extension to analogy. There are certain common principles on which the Sharīeʿa is generally based. These reside 
in the protection of one’s life, his/her mind, offspring, religion as well as property. It should be noted that the element 
of universality is of dominant importance as the law intends to serve interests of Muslims at large. Islamic law, like 
any other law, is full of a set of legal terms with concepts which may not exist in other legislations, notwithstanding 
the fact that such legal notions endure conceptual progresses across different legal systems. Thus, even though 
concepts peculiar to legal terms go through certain processes of development across miscellaneous sets of laws, they, 
yet, have different legal existence in various laws. 
54 JEFF JONES & LYNDIA SAAD, GALLUP POLL SOCIAL SERIES: CRIME, GALLOP NEWS SERV. (Oct. 2018); see also 
Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior under New Scrutiny, 1 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 151 (2005) (“Social science has long played a role in examining the efficacy and fairness 
of the death penalty. Empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment were cited by the Supreme Court 
in its landmark cases in the 1970s; most notable was the 1975 Isaac Ehrlich study, which used multivariate regression 
analysis and purported to show a significant marginal deterrent effect over life imprisonment, but which was soon 
roundly criticized for methodological flaws.”). 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 See Patrick McDonnell, Death by Stoning: Battered Syrian City Offers a Window into Life under the Thumb of 
Islamic State Militants, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-
palmyra-town-20170521-story.html. 
58 See generally Mohamed  A. ‘Arafa & Jonathan G. Burns, Judicial Corporal Punishment in the United States?: 
Lessons from Islamic Criminal Law for Curing the Ills of Mass Incarceration, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385 
(2015). 
59 Id. at 390-91 (“The first of these offenses, Al-Zena, relates to fornication or adultery. The crime may be proven by 
confession or the testimony of four eyewitnesses and is sanctioned by flogging with a hundred lashes.”). 
60 See generally MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRAH, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (1974); Rod 
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punishment was used only in the most serious of cases, and only when there was almost irrefutable 
evidence.61 Four witnesses would be required to actually see the act of adultery, an unlikely event, 
and should they be shown to be offering false testimony, they themselves would receive the 
punishment of 80 lashings each.62 
Judaism, unlike the Qur’an, actually introduces stoning in its source text, as well as 
mentions other terrifying punishments like serefah (burning) and chenek (strangulation).63 Similar 
to Islamic law, the scholars who interpreted the Hebrew Bible explained that in order for judgment 
of death to be passed, there needed to be (a) two witnesses who saw the criminal act, (b) the 
witnesses must have warned the perpetrator of the criminality of the act either right before or 
within seconds of him committing the act, and (c) the perpetrator needed to have acknowledged 
the warning and continued with his criminal action regardless.64 Furthermore, there is even a 
famous proclamation made in tractate Sanhedrin (judges) stating that if the high court made a 
unanimous verdict of guilt against a person, that person was immediately released and not 
punished, with the lesson being that if none of the judges could find a reason to exonerate the 
accused, then it was indicative of something wrong with the court.65 In essence, requirements for 
capital punishment are so extensive that those studying the field deem it a largely symbolic 
punishment.66 
In fact, Dr. Brown recounts the fact that in the “roughly five hundred years that the Ottoman 
Empire ruled Constantinople, records show that only one instance of stoning for adultery took 
place . . . .”67 For context, Brown adds the fact that in colonial America, a haven for enlightened 
Western ideology, from only 1608-1785, over 50 people were executed for various sexual 
crimes.68 From the perspective of Judaism, this is similar to a famous teaching imparted by Rabbi 
Eleazar ben Azariah in the Mishnah, who stated that a Jewish court that executed even one person 
in seventy years was considered a bloodthirsty court.69 The philosopher Maimonides further stated 
in the 12th  century that “It is better . . . to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single 
innocent one to death.”70 
Essentially, both Judaism and Islam use these capital crimes as potential threats to the 
citizens of their nations, as they understood clearly the concept of a deterrence from performing 
 
61 See generally NASSER A. AL-KHOLAIFY, MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PENALTY OF 
TA‘AZIR IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (1992); Jonathon Brown, Stoning and Hand Cutting: Understanding the Hudud 
and the Shariah in Islam, YAQEEN INST. 7 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/stoning-and-
hand-cutting-understanding-the-hudud-and-the-shariah-in-islam/#.XZt3LkZKiUk [http://perma.cc/BCY9-DDSX] 
(“The concept of hudud in Islamic criminal law is not found in the Qur’an, though it is referred to in hadiths considered 
authentic by Muslims. Ḥudūd in Arabic is the plural of ḥadd, meaning limit or boundary. The Qur’an mentions the 
‘limits of God’ several times, warning Muslims of the sin of transgressing them and that they should not even approach 
them.”).  
62 Brown, supra note 61, at 9. 
63 Kalimi, supra note 23. 
64 See generally Sanaz Alasti, Comparative Study of Stoning Punishment in the Religions of Islam and Judaism, 4 
JUST. POL’Y J. 1, 2 (2007) (“In Islam, there are no clear instructions about stoning in Qur’an, but there are some 
implications in Hadiths (saying and stories about Prophet Mohammad’s behaviors told by his close followers), but it 
has been mentioned in Torah.”).  
65 See Sanhedrin 17a:17 (William Davidson ed.). 
66
 RABBI ARYEH KAPLAN, 2 HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT, at 170-71 (1992). 
67 Brown, supra note 61, at 18. 
68 Id.  
69 See Mishnah Makkot 1:10, at 2 (Sefaria Cmty. trans.). 
70 WARREN GOLDSTEIN, DEFENDING THE HUMAN SPIRIT: JEWISH LAW’S VISION FOR A MORAL SOCIETY 269 (2006). 
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other crimes.71 Their interpretation worked seamlessly into an already complex legal system. The 
intention of this example is to demonstrate the deep thought that went into these interpretations 
and the following traditions dating back hundreds, to thousands of years.72 One who flips casually 
through the pages of both the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’an, will find themselves at a loss to 
appreciate the text and, if using a literal interpretation method, will likely come away with a 
negative view.73 
But perhaps most importantly, it is critical that these interpretations are linked to actual 
logical thought and process, rather than simply changing the meaning of text in order to more aptly 
fit a new generation’s understanding of morality.74 While there is indeed an oral tradition handed 
down throughout the generations to compliment and explain the written Hebrew Bible, such 
rabbinical rulings must still be based on logic and the exact teachings of the previous generation.75 
Specifically, we go back to the example of an “eye for an eye” quote—introduced earlier—which 
has been interpreted to mean pecuniary payment rather than actual physical harm to a person who 
has wronged you.76 The sources in the Talmud argued that if this did indeed mean that in the event 
of a tortious action, for example one person accidently or purposefully knocks out somebody’s 
eyes, then the punishment could not apply to somebody who is blind.77 A person who lacks sight 
could commit certain crimes with no danger of punishment, and this obviously goes against a 
plethora of other sources that explain that justice must be dealt “universally” and not just to a 
specific class of people.78 
C. Public Outlook: Will Things Change? 
What does this mean going forward? As explained, there appears to be a disconnect 
between the casual reader and the knowledgeable one, regarding the ability to understand more 
than merely the surface-level translation. Furthermore, while there are indeed many similarities 
between Judaism and Islam, there is also a vastly different public perception of the religions’s 
legal systems.79 In non-Islamic cultures, Islam and its legal structure are largely viewed as 
medieval and outdated, while the Talmud is somewhat more well-respected as a work of legal 
fascination, even in places like South Korea, where an entire sub-culture of Talmud study has 
emerged.80 Young-sam Ma, the South Korean Ambassador to Israel, even went as far to say, “Each 
Korean family has at least one copy of the Talmud.”81 
So, what causes this imbalance in criticism and how can the Islamic legal structure gain 
more respect in the West? First, the imbalance is likely caused by the vast discrepancy in 
 
71 Alasti, supra note 64. 
72 Id.  
73 Brown, supra note 61. 
74 ‘Arafa & Burns, supra note 58, at 389-90. 
75 KALIMI, supra note 23. 
76 See Bava Kamma 83b:8, 84a:1 (William Davidson ed.). 
77 KAPLAN, supra note 66. 
78 Id. It is important to stress—at least for Islam—that the Qur’anic punishment are much lighter than the following 
juridical (and Sunnah) provisions. 
79 De Donno, supra note 34, at 383-84. 
80 Ross Arbes, How The Talmud Became A Best-Seller in South Korea, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/how-the-talmud-became-a-best-seller-in-south-korea 
[http://perma.cc/9L27-ZF2H]. It should be noted that the craze began with a Japanese translation and was then 
translated to Korean.  
81 Id. This is not to say that the Talmud does not receive its fair share of criticism for many of its own verses, some of 
which may not comport necessarily with today’s ideas of woman and human rights. But evidently, this criticism does 
not seem to be as loud as it is with the Qur’an and/or Sunnah. 
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population as well as what occurs in practice versus in study.82 Followers of Islam outnumber 
followers of Judaism significantly, with estimates of Jewish populations in the world floating 
around 14.5 million, while estimates adherents to Islam are at about 1.8 billion, or roughly 24% of 
the world’s total human population.83 While Judaism receives significant focus in discussion, 
attention is more easily turned to the Islamic system considering the impact to daily life just based 
on their numbers.84 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Islam indeed has a very real 
problem with a radical minority who have used their interpretations to violently act out on innocent 
civilians and governments. While a minority, these extremist groups still endanger many lives, 
moreover, claiming to do so in the name of their religion.85 While it is a minority, that still leaves 
radical Muslim people committing horrific acts, and all claiming to be doing it in the name of their 
religion.86 This has, unfairly but perhaps somewhat understandably, turned many people in western 
and far eastern countries against the religion of Islam.87 To promote better understanding, acts of 
violence and terrorism need to be stopped, or in the meantime roundly condemned by the larger 
Islamic moderate community (which already occurs often).88 In addition though, it is important 
that schools and institutions of education emphasize a more in-depth understanding of religion. 
Sometimes what is worse than receiving no education is receiving just a little bit, usually enough 
to introduce some statistics out of context and maybe a brief history, before moving onto the next 
subject.89 
III. Guarding the Guardians and Islamic Democracy: Does it Exist? 
Decades before globalization turned the world’s attention to the democracy, or the lack 
thereof, in the Muslim and Middle Eastern world, Western scholars began tracking the spread of 
democracy around the world and sought to understand what societies need in order to support 
democracy. Before the relationship between Islam and democracy became of particular interest—
and without getting bogged down in unnecessary theories—to Western scholars, a framework for 
understanding the interaction between democracy and society had been established. 
 
82 See, e.g., WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, BERMAN JEWISH DATABANK (2018), 
https://www.jewishdatabank.org/databank/search-results/study/1060 [http://perma.cc/UU36-ENFE]. 
83 Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the World, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-
world/ [http://perma.cc/MR43-B532] (“Our 2017 survey of U.S. Muslims finds that Muslims in the United States 
perceive a lot of discrimination against their religious group. Moreover, a solid majority of U.S. Muslims are leery of 
President Donald Trump and think their fellow Americans do not see Islam as part of mainstream U.S. society. At the 
same time, however, Muslim Americans overwhelmingly say they are proud to be Americans, believe that hard work 
generally brings success in this country and are satisfied with the way things are going in their own lives.”).  
84 Id.; see, e.g., Dawood I. Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The Surprising 
Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions, 54 VA. J. INT’L. L. 615 (2014) (providing an empirical 
review of all Islamic law constitutional clauses); Intisar A. Rabb, We the Jurists: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527 (2008) (providing a qualitative review of one such clause in the context of three common 
types of Islamic constitutionalization). 
85 Nordland, supra note 60. Paying lip service to current Islamophobia is politically correct, especially in the United 
States and Europe, but not paying lip service to popular prejudices. 
86 Id. 
87 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005). 
88 See generally NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008) (analyzing the increasing 
popularity of calls for Shari‘a as a basis for state law in Middle Eastern contexts); RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEOCRACY (2010) (surveying the increasing role of Islamic and other religious laws as modem state laws). 
89 It is incumbent on educators to provide fuller context and history regarding the religion of Islam. 
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A. The Prerequisites of Democracy 
In this regard, Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, in parsing out “What Democracy is . . . 
and is Not,” note a few key characteristics that democratic societies have that make them 
democratic.90 They assert that “democracy’s freedoms should . . . encourage citizens to deliberate 
among themselves, to discover their common needs, and to resolve their differences without 
relying on some supreme central authority.”91 They describe civil society at its best as providing 
“an intermediate layer of governance between the individual and the state that is capable of 
resolving conflicts and controlling the behavior of members without public coercion.”92 They cite 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America” in support of these propositions.93 The 
importance to a discussion of Islam and Democracy is that what Schmitter and Karl fail to mention 
is the “intermediate layer of governance” that they describe was, in de Tocqueville’s time, very 
religious in nature, and specifically Protestant Christian; i.e., it was a religiously-homogenous 
society, relative to American society today.94 Though the intermediate layer need not be Protestant, 
nor Christian, nor religious at all; it could be any of those, including Muslim.95 
Schmitter and Karl also explain two more prerequisites of democracy, “implicit prior 
conditions” which they append to Robert Dahl’s “procedural minimal” conditions for modern 
democracy.96 The first condition is that “[p]opularly elected officials must be able to exercise their 
constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding opposition . . . from unelected 
officials.”97 Democracy is in jeopardy if military officers or religious clergy retain the capacity to 
act independently of elected civilians or even veto, officially or unofficially, decisions made by 
the people’s representatives.98 As concerns religious clergy, this gets at a crucial defining 
characteristic of separation between church and state, or rather, mosque and state, as democracy 
and Islam cannot work together if one seeks to govern the other.  
In the same vein, Schmitter and Karl’s second implicit prior definition is that the polity 
must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other 
overarching political system.99 Schmitter and Karl were referring to neocolonial arrangements, 
arguing that a country is not truly democratic if the decisions of its elected officials are subject to 
the approval of actors outside their territorial domain.100 The principle is, however, equally 
applicable in the domestic religion-state context. For a democracy to function in a Muslim country, 
the decisions of its elected officials cannot be subject to the approval of the religious 
 
90 Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is . . . And Is Not?, 3 J. DEMOCRACY 2, 7 (1991). 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 7-8.  
93 Id. 
94 See generally Aurelian Craiutu & Jeremy Jennings, The Third Democracy: Tocqueville’s Views of America After 
1840, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 391 (2004) (“Democracy in America (1835, 1840) offered the image of an accomplished 
and successful American democracy based on the equality of conditions and the sovereignty of the people. American 
democracy combined administrative decentralization and political centralization, allowed for self-government, and 
provided for a judicious separation of powers and a genuine system of checks and balances.”).  
95 See generally ABRAHAM S. EISENSTADT, RECONSIDERING TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1988). 
96 Schmitter & Karl, supra note 90, at 9. 
97 Id. at 9. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
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establishment.101 Taken together, Schmitter and Karl’s two implicit prior definitions inform a 
crucial precondition of democracy in Muslim countries: where the religious establishment is more 
powerful than the government, democracy will not succeed, as where the government tries to exert 
power over or independently of the Muslim establishment, the government may not succeed.102 
B. Prerequisites of the Islamic Government 
It is impossible to simply talk about Islam and democracy in a vacuum. To do so would 
lead one to mistakenly assert that Islam necessitates a particular form of governance. This could 
not be further from the truth. In fact, “[T]he Qur’an itself did not specify a particular form of 




101 Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 
(1992) (“[T]he most significant debates taking place in the region today are not about secularization versus promotion 
of Islamic forms of government. Rather, they are about the democratization of existing governments in a manner 
consistent with Islamic law, a process which, though informed by Western democratic experiences, is viewed as 
neither Western nor secular.”). 
102 See generally Melanie D. Reed, Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The Application of Shari'a in a Modern 
World, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 485 (2003) (“One difficulty in marrying Islamic ideals with Western notions of 
democracy is that Western and Islamic societies possess somewhat differing notions of what constitutes core human 
rights.”). Probably, that’s the case in the religious (theocratic) monarchies like Iran, Morocco or Saudi Arabia, but this 
is not the case in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq among others, as nor the paradigm worked in the past, at 
least until the failure of post-colonial states. 
103 KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ET. AL., ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY (2004) 
http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR28.2/abou.html [https://perma.cc/WP3C-ZMJD]. 
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This diagram assists in allowing one to visualize the complex relation between the main 
concepts of Islamic polity. It says that sovereignty pertains to God, while authority pertains to 
people. God’s care for His community (māslāhā) is bestowed to ummāh (community) through 
legal and political devices (shāri’a, shurā, etc.) whose performers are the Caliphs and the Sultans, 
on the one hand, and the ‘ulāmā’ on the other hand. ‘Ulāmā’ and other ulu’l-āmr (holders of 
power) get their legitimacy from the Prophet’s political authority, being vice-regents of the Prophet 
in his political functions. The system looks strictly and functionally intertwined and in theory 
works perfectly, although the practice has been obviously different and absolute rulership (mulk) 
has been the common feature in Islamic polity over the centuries. The concept of the state is one 
of the most controversial in Islamic political thought and has been widely debated. Approaching 
the question, in the first place it could be useful to solve the problem of definition: what is the 
Islamic state? The most obvious answer, to use Patricia Crone’s expression, is that the Islamic 
state is the state where religion regulates temporal affairs.104 In more precise and refined terms, it 
is the state where hākimiyya (God’s sovereignty) is in force, expressed through the Shari’a 
(religious law). Scholarly research has questioned when and how the Qur’an and the sunna, the 
elements making up the Shari’a, were established. Naturally, opinions differ, and some Orientalists 
have maintained that the Qur’an and the sunna were not formed in the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad, but in later periods of varying lengths.105 If this is true, it is clear that an Islamic state 
where the Shari’a ruled has never existed. The fact that the Shari’a is merely a historical product 
minimizes the very concept of the Islamic state and projects it into an evolutionary dimension, 
irrespective of the discourse concerning the formation of the Shari’a.106 Beyond their historical 
importance, what is really significant and decisive is that, from the Muslims’ point of view, the 
Qur’an and the sunna are the direct constituents of the prophetic and human experience of 
Muhammad, so that, from the very beginning, they formed the basis of the Islamic state.107 
Then the next question will be, When did the exceptional circumstance of the 
implementation of the sharī‘a begin and therefore of the sovereignty of God? The most obvious 
—and objective—response is that in the time of the Prophet, when he was a statesman and the 
bearer of the revelation in Medina (622–632), but did this exceptional condition survive him? 
Sunni Muslims will answer yes, as they consider the time of the four “Rightly Guided” (rāshidūn) 
Caliphs, Abū Bakr (632–634), ‘Omar (634-644), ‘Othmān (644–656), and ‘Alī (656-661)—also 
blessed by God. The four Caliphs are believed to have followed the example of the Prophet and 
applied the Shari’a.108 Some doubts could arise in light of the fact that three out of the first four 
Caliphs, all of them except Abū Bakr, were murdered, as the situation was therefore far from being 
idyllic. In any case, Shi’ite Muslims refuse to recognize the exceptional nature of the “Rightly 
Guided” Caliphs and only recognize the superiority of ‘Alī. Consequently, there is no agreement 
within the Muslim community itself. Thus, it is highly debatable whether the period of the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs can be considered a phase enlightened by God during which an Islamic state was 
established.109 
 
104 CRONE, supra note 11. For further discussion, see generally MASSIMO CAMPANINI & KARIM MEZRAM, TRADIZIONE, 
RIFORMA E MILITANZA IN ETÀ CONTEMPORANEA [TRADITIONS, REFORM, AND RADICALISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
STATE] [ARCHIPELAGO ISLAM: INTRODUCTION] (Laterza 2007). 
105 Id. 
106 CRONE, supra note 11. 
107 Id. 
108 CAMPANINI & MEZRAM, supra note 104. 
109 Id. 
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In our view, after the rāshidūn Caliphs, the Omayyad (661–750) and ‘Abbasid (750–1258) 
dynasties can certainly no longer be considered as having created an Islamic state. It is difficult to 
argue that Shari’a ruled the state, while different ways of political administration and management, 
which can probably be summarized under the label of qānūn (law), gradually became established, 
limiting the role of the Shari’a. It goes without saying that the dynasties of Sultans like the Buyid, 
the Seljuqs, and later the Ayyubids or the Mamluks formed even less an Islamic state than the 
Caliphates.110 However, it is obvious that the idea of an Islamic state implies the discussion of the 
relationship between religion and politics in Islam. An Islamic state plainly seems to involve the 
integration of religion and politics by definition.111 This may indeed have been the case in the time 
of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, as he received inspiration and the revelation from God and 
in light of this, ruled the political community of Medina like a Bedouin shaykh.112 
Ibn Khaldūn’s argument supports the now widely held historiographical claim of many 
scholars, the present authors included, that the early separation of political authority and religious 
function was one of the main characteristics of Islamic theory and praxis.113 In the Islamic history, 
the absence of an institutional Church ensured that religion could not monopolize or control the 
public sphere. Rather, religion or the representatives of Shari’a law were always forced to compete 
to influence the public sphere in a variety of ways.114 Importantly, throughout the Islamic history, 
there has never been a single voice representing the Shari’a law or the canons of religion. 
Historically, the Islamic faith and Shari’a law have been represented by several competing schools 
of theological and jurisprudential thought, the most powerful and notable of these organized into 
privately run professional guilds. Although the state often claimed to rule in God’s name, the 
legitimacy of such claims was challenged by these professional guilds.115 
Pluralism of voices, as a natural characteristic of the Islamic pattern of thought, impedes 
the strict cross-referentiality of religion and public power. On the other hand, the state claimed to 
be supported by religious law but failed in depriving the ‘ulamā’ (Muslim scholars) of their 
religious authority or silencing civil society. Obviously, the same could be said of religion: it failed 
in impeding the autonomous rule of political power nor in silencing civil society.116 
When the ‘Abbasid Caliph Al-Ma’mūn (813–833) tried to impose Caliphal control over 
religious authority through the imposition of the Mu‘tazili doctrine of the created Qur’an and 
organizing the mihna, he tried to realize a form of Caesarism-papism which had to submit religious 
authority to the Caliph’s mulk. It is well known that such an endeavour was defeated by the 
converging opposition of the conservative and traditionalist ‘ulamā’ and of the populace itself.117 




112 If this is true for the period of Muhammad and, at least according to Sunni Muslims, for the four “Rightly Guided” 
Caliphs, this is no longer the case with the Omayyads and the ‘Abbasids, when, as even Ibn Khaldūn maintained, the 
caliphate was translated into the mulk; therefore power legitimized by religion was translated into power legitimized 
by force, by the capitalization of resources and by tyranny. 
113 See generally SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH & ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAM AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (2003). 
114 See generally MASSIMO CAMPANINI, IDEOLOGIA E POLITICA NELL’ISLAM [IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN ISLAM] 
(2007). 
115 KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS 22 (2005). 
116 CAMPANINI, supra note 114.  
117 See generally Nimrod Hurvitz, Al-Ma’mūn and the Mihna, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY 649 
(Sabine Schmidtke ed. 2016). Hurvitz’s interpretation is questionable, however, insofar as it belittles the theological-
political meaning of the caliph’s action: actually al-Ma’mūn aimed to impose his own (secular) authority over the 
religious establishment. 
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their autonomy in respect of the central power, and that does not mean that the ‘ulamā’ claimed to 
control the mulk similarly to how the Catholic Church claimed to control the temporal sword 
against the German Holy Roman emperor.118 The two powers in the Muslim world co-existed in 
parallel, although the sovereigns claimed to govern in the name of the religion and the ‘ulamā’ to 
autonomously control legislative power.119 In his book Iqtisād fī’l-i‘tiqād, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī 
(1058–1111) contends that “din (religion) and sultan (power) are twins (sinwān)”; thus, he does 
not mean that there is a single holder of religious authority and of political authority (as the Pope 
and the Emperor in the Medieval Christian world claimed, opposing one another).120 Rather, he 
means that power defends religion, and religion supports power. Thus, a clear joint presence of the 
two authorities emerge and this parallelism is characteristic throughout the history of the classic 
Muslim world.121 
On the other hand, Noah Feldman’s contention that all the “medieval” experience of 
governance was, on the whole, the outcome of the practical realization of the Islamic state must 
be discussed and refuted; also, because when Ibn Khaldūn describes the transformation of the 
Islamic state from Caliphate to mulk, he describes the separation between religion and the state: 
the Caliphate was a religious state founded on ‘asabiyya; the mulk was a secular state founded on 
force and tyranny. Feldman argued that the entire “medieval” Islamic experience of governance 
was, on the whole, the outcome of the practical realization of the Islamic state, as the Islamic state 
is founded on the Shari’a and is the state of the law.122 In the Middle Ages, the Shari’a was 
protected and defended by the ‘ulamā,’ and the rulers were subservient to the Shari’a.123 Their rule 
was legitimized by the ‘ulamā.’124 Through the Shari’a and the law, the ‘ulamā’ succeeded in 
creating the ruler and the government, and the classical and traditional Islamic constitution was a 
legal state, meaning that the system was justified by law and administered through law; hence, the 
Islamic state was fully implemented, being a kind of theocracy.125  
In this regard, Feldman’s paradigm is subject to a sort of discourse of disagreement. First, an 
Islamic theocracy has never existed, as Islam is not a theocracy because no church exists in 
Islam.126 Moreover, if it is true that, after the failure of al-Ma’mūn’s project, there is very little 
evidence of Caliphal control over religious authorities or of Caliphal dominance over jurists and 
jurisprudence, nor did the ‘ulamā’ usurp Caliphs and sultans of their power of rule; and if it is true 
that sharī‘a was submitted to overall human elaboration by fiqh and qānūn, consequently, God 
ceased to reign over Earth because the sharī‘a was only the ideal reference by which legitimizing 
the secular control of power by Caliphs and sultans.127 The Islamic state continued to be a 
perspective of the past. When Ibn Khaldūn describes the transformation of the Islamic state from 
Caliphate to mulk, he describes the separation between religion and the state: the Caliphate was a 
religious state founded on the ‘asabiyya; the mulk was a secular state founded on force and the 
capitalization of power.128 This is the reason why, in Ibn Khaldūn’s view, the Caliphate is merely 
 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI, AL-IQTISĀD FĪ’L-I‘TIQĀD [MODERATION IN BELIEF] 231 (Aladdin M. Yaqub ed. 2013). 
121 Id.  
122 See FELDMAN, supra note 88.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
127 Hurvitz, supra note 117.  
128 Id.  
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a teleological pattern, as when, in the 8th and 14th centuries, the Caliphate was dead and the 
sultanate was dominant, the former model of the Rightly Guided Caliphs could be considered as 
the best state ever realized on Earth—a true Islamic state.129 It cannot be reproduced at present, 
but it must, however, direct the political action of the current holders of power from the viewpoint 
of the Islamic principles of justice, equity, religious support for political authority, and the refusal 
of capitalization.  
Moreover, if Feldman’s argument that the Islamic state was rendered Islamic by the 
‘ulamā’ is accurate, it would be complicated to explain and understand why sophisticated political 
thinkers like al-Ghazālī and Ibn Jamā‘a recognized the supremacy of the sultans over the Caliphs 
by way of their monopoly of force.130 The sultans ruled not through law or the scholars, but through 
force, arms, and secular power; exploiting religion for their political ends. An Islamic model of 
state in place of the Islamic state was theorized.131 Al-Mawardī (d. 1058) tried to recreate the 
Caliphate being aware of its weakness; the Caliphate was the Islamic state but had to be re-
established in the 5th–11th centuries because it had lost real control over the Islamic empire and 
society.132 Ibn Taymiyya formulated the siyāsa shar‘iyya because he was aware that the rulers 
were no longer applying the Law of God; thus, it was necessary to formulate siyāsa (politics) based 
on religious law because the Shari’a was no longer working. Ibn Khaldūn was convinced that the 
Caliphate—the Islamic state—had become a mulk—a patrimonial and tyrannical power, that the 
new rulers had forgotten the Shari’a of the first rightly guided Caliphs and were governing in their 
own interests. The perfect situation of the past was no more than a dream, while tyranny, force, 
and injustice prevailed in the Muslim world.133 
There is a wide debate regarding Islam’s compatibility with democracy. Many scholars 
argued that the question of a democratic Islam has no meaning at all, because the two terms are 
completely at odds.134 Surely, the question is highly controversial for two reasons. First, it is 
significant to avoid the so-called “essentialist” interpretation of Islam, as essentialist approaches  
(like Bernard Lewis’s) “tend to obscure the diversity of realities and representations in the Islamic 
world in order to reinforce the idea of an eternal, monolithic Islam, without history and outside of 
history,” whereas “the meaning [of the religion] will always be determined more by the demands 
of context than the logic of text and more by the needs and desires of actors than the intentions of 
a founding genius.”135 When discussing the correlation between Islam and democracy it is critical 
not to forget the historical environment where these dialectics took place. On the other hand, the 
locution “Islam and democracy” could not make sense insofar as Islam is a religion while 
 
129 Id.  
130 See generally RICHARD JOSEPH MCCARTHY, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF AL-
GHAZĀLĪʼS AL-MUNQIDH MIN AL-DALĀL AND OTHER RELEVANT WORKS OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ (Ilse Lichtenstadter ed. 
1980). 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 See generally FAROUK MITHA, AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND THE ISMAʻILIS: A DEBATE ON REASON AND AUTHORITY IN 
MEDIEVAL ISLAM (Farhad Daftary ed. 2001). 
134 See Alvaro Hasani, Compatibility of Democracy and Islam . . . or the Lack Thereof: A Closer Look at Whether 
the ”Arab Spring” was Ever Capable of Culminating into a Viable Democracy in the Arab World, 15 ST. MARY’S L. 
REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 715, 734 (2013).  
135 See generally MOHAMED-CHERIF FERJANI, LE POLITIQUE ET LE RELIGIEUX DANS LE CHAMP ISLAMIQUE [Politics 
and Religion in Islamic Thought] (Fr. 2005) (“[T]endent à occulter la diversité des réalités et des representations 
relevant de le champ islamique, afin de conforter l’idée d’un Islam eternel, monolithique, sans histoire et en dehors 
de l’histoire», whereas «le sens [de la religion] sera toujours déterminé par les exigences du contexte plus que par la 
logique du texte, par les besoin et les désires des acteurs plus que par les intentions d’un génie fondateur.”). 
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democracy is a political system and we ought to clearly mark the conceptual boundaries of both, 
far besides the respective field of inquiry. 
Historically, democracy is certainly a foreign idea for the Islamic outlook however. It was 
imported with other Western ideals and political practices, such as “liberalism,” between the 19th 
and the 20th centuries. The foreign nature of these categories is proved by the fact that the Arabic 
language resorted to neologisms in order to express them: lībirāliyya and dīmuqrāiyya are nouns 
reproducing the Western political lexicon and do not have any equivalents in classical Islamic 
political thought, neither of al-Māwardī nor of Ibn Taymiyya or of Ibn Khaldūn.136 In this regard, 
it should be noted that the reception of the concept of democracy was paralleled by the reception 
of the concept of nationalism. National ideas in the Arab and Islamic countries developed during 
the liberation struggle against colonialism and, in a sense, meant the recovery of the concept of 
identity after the alienation produced by colonial submission.137 On the other hand, democracy 
does mean—or at least it could mean—the successful adaptation to the contemporary world’s 
requirements, the world of globalization where democracy became progressively the uniquely 
suitable political system, but this adaptation has been the aim pursued by states and civil societies 
at large after the attainment of independence. Nationalism represented the first step in the long 
path towards the full acknowledgment of modernity; democracy could represent, and perhaps 
actually is, the eventual union with modernity.138  
Democracy is identified with Western civilization, but the contradictory politics of the 
great powers in the Middle East—for instance in the two recent Gulf wars and with respect to the 
Islamic resurgence—encourage many people to oppose the West and democracy at the same time. 
Laura Guazzone and others argued recently that in the Arab world, the Gulf War of 1991 provoked 
a widespread reinforcement of anti-Western feelings and a break in the already weak inter-Arab 
solidarity, although it undoubtedly led to an acceleration of internal political transformations.139 
The same reaction was triggered by the second Gulf war of 2003 against Saddam Hussein.140 
Economic decline and social upheaval stimulated political renewal and change in the 1980s and 
later in many Arab countries, but the Islamic way of expression became paramount throughout.141 
The hostility of Arab and Islamic public opinion of the 1991 war against Iraq was widespread 
among the Arab masses, and the Islamic opposition was able to take advantage of the 
 
136 Although the Greek word demokratìa has been transliterated in dīmuqrā¥iyyah in the Arabic translation of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see ARISTŪ ¥ĀLĪS, AL-A²LĀQ 293-94 (A. Badawi. ed. Kuwait 1979).  
137 The idea of nationalism brought with itself political fragmentation, Islamic religious universalism remained 
unshaken and this universal religious consciousness is probably still working throughout the whole Islamic world. As 
Ibrahim Abu Rabi‘ put it, in the Arab world “nationalism resurrected Islam as an Arab religion and Muhammad as an 
Arab prophet. Both Nationalism and Islamism invented their own versions of the past, and both anchored their ideal 
in a highly unstable present.” See generally IBRAHIM ABU RABI‘, CONTEMPORARY ARAB THOUGHT (2004). It is a 
case; but even after the failure of secular Arab Nationalism (from Nasser onward), Islam remained the castanet 
universal value in the mass consciousness. 
138 See generally AHMAD MOUSSALLI, THE ISLAMIC QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY: PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2001). 
139 See, e.g., LAURA GUAZZONE, FEDERICA BICCHI, & DANIELA PIOPPI, LA QUESTIONE DELLA DEMOCRAZIA NEL 
MONDO ARABO (ISLAMICA) [THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD] (2004). 
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circumstances, as this opposition was made much stronger by this struggle until it represented a 
serious threat for actual regimes, for instance in Algeria and Egypt.142 
Democracy is a difficult concept in relation to Islam, as it is necessary to understand what 
the word “democracy” means. The most salient features of democracy—in the Western 
perspective—are that democracy is a procedure involving free political elections and granting 
universal suffrage; the highest governmental form of democracy is a parliamentary system with a 
multi-party choice; and democracy provides protection for human rights, liberty of expression, of 
dissent and of political organization.143 Undoubtedly, most of these requirements are not present 
in the Arab and Islamic world today.144 Some pivotal concepts of classical Islamic political thought 
point to the same direction of democracy; however, a covenant among rulers and ‘ahd (ruled), 
ijma‘a (consensus of the representatives of the community), legitimization of public power through 
preference and ihktiyār (free will), ‘adalah (justice), maslah (common welfare), and musawatt 
(equality).145 These are universal and commonly shared concepts. Moreover, Islam is a 
Universalist ideology encompassing all humanity to which revelation was addressed and is a 
cosmopolitan reality where all peoples are located on the same horizontal level.146 There is no 
difference of race in Islam; differences of religion are sometimes emphasized, but not of race. If 
universalism and cosmopolitanism are presuppositions of democracy, the Islamic way to 
democracy must be grounded in this past universalism and cosmopolitanism.147  
The main concept that seems to be irreducible to democracy is that of the ummah, the 
community of believers bound together by faith and religious profession. For if one is not a 
believer, he or she cannot be a full part of the community, whereas modern democracy is above 
any religious affiliation.148 The notion of ša‘b (people) has been connected in Western political 
outlook with the idea of watan (nation), but both of these did not exist in classical Islamic political 
thought and were substituted by the concepts of ummah and Caliphate. No doubt “people” and 
“nation” are ideas constitutive of the history of Western democracy, but ummah is not completely 
in contradiction with the idea of democracy, insofar as it involves collective ethics and the 
necessity of a common welfare overcoming individual interests and selfishness.149  
A very controversial issue regarding democracy is secularism. Are democracy and 
secularism so intertwined that we cannot think of one without the other? Does secularism impose 
a democratic political system, and does democracy have secularism as its founding principle? The 
answer seems to be positive in Western political thought whose development in modern times, 
from Machiavelli to Locke to John Stuart Mill, developed the concepts of democracy and freedom 
on the basis of a clear distinction between the religious and the political sphere; the former is 
private, and the latter is public.150 As for Islam, the idea of secularism has broadened also in the 
Islamic world during the last decades, especially in the daily behavior of people (How many young 
 
142 The same perception has been obviously strengthened by the 2003 war against the Iraq of Saddām Hussein, a war 
Arabs and Muslims judged in blatant contrast to international right. See generally Massimo Campanini, Democracy 
in the Islamic Political Concept, 2/3 ORIENTE MODERNO 343 (2005).   
143 MOUSSALLI, supra note 138.  
144 See BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM (1988).  
145 For further details regarding the Islamic political thought, see Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, 
(1988); CRONE, supra note 11; see also ANTONY BLACK, THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT (2d ed. 
2001). 
146 CRONE, supra note 11.  
147 See generally MASSIMO CAMPANINI, ISLAM E POLITICA [ISLAM AND POLITICS] (It. 2003).  
148 MOUSSALLI, supra note 138. 
149 Id.  
150 FERJANI, supra note 135.   
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individuals attend the mosques, in particular when they live abroad?); and secularism was coupled 
with scientific rationalism, the vindication of human rights and democracy.151 This represented a 
serious challenge to traditional and conservative Islam. For the ideas of secularism, natural rights 
and democracy could be at odds with a traditional Islamic outlook.152 For instance, secularism can 
be opposed to theocracy and most observers maintain that Islam is theocratic.153 Natural rights 
seem to conflict with the subjective ethics of Islam where God and not nature decided what is good 
and what is bad.154 Democracy as a government of the people (where the people is the origin and 
source of legitimacy and power) contradicts the more widespread Islamic idea that God is the 
origin and source of the power.155  
Regarding theocracy, in the evolution of the Islamic political thought, especially in the 
classical period of Islamic civilization, the so-called Middle Ages, three theoretical 
presuppositions can be distilled in this domain: 
 
(a) Religion is an extension of politics. 
(b) Politics is a dimension of religion. 
(c) Religion is a dimension of politics. 
 
The first proposition points to theocentrism, the second to theocracy, and the third to 
secularism. Only the first one—according to the authors—is appropriately Islamic. For Islam, as 
din wa dunyah (religion and worldly existence), must have a political extension considering that 
the mu‘amalat (social actions and behaviors) is the other face of the spiritual (religious) 
observances (‘ibidat) coin.156 The second proposition involving theocracy has been denied by 
history, as right from the beginning of Islamic history a wedge separated the factual management 
of power from the religious establishment.157 Caliphs and Sultans ruled out of the Shari’a norms, 
legitimizing their power more on the basis of force and the army than on religion and justice, 
although they looked for a religious acknowledgment of their authority.158 On the other hand, the 
‘ulama’ never claimed political power for themselves in the name of their religious status, and this 
is the reason why neither the plenitudo potestatis papae nor the so-called "two swords" doctrine 
arose in the Muslim world, where there was no conflict between an “Empire” and a “Papacy.”159 
The third proposition conveys properly the idea of secularism insofar as religion is viewed as a 
mere appendage or instrument of political practice and governance.  
Those values, if anything, are quite compatible with democracy; “classical Muslim scholars 
embraced core elements of modern democratic practice” such as “rule of law and limited 
 
151 On the implications of contemporary Islamic thought, see generally MASSIMO CAMPANINI, IL PENSIERO ISLAMICO 
CONTEMPORANEO [THE CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC THINKING] (It. 2005).  
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157 See generally Ira M. Lapidus, The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society, 6 
INT’L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 363 (1975). 
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government.”160 At the same time, however, those values were not seen by those Muslim scholars 
as promoting a government by the people, or anyone else for that matter.161 Professor Khaled Abou 
elFadl gets at the core of the issue in Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, where he notes that 
“[i]n Islam, God is the only sovereign and ultimate source of legitimate law.”162 Thus, any law 
made by a sovereign “is illegitimate because it substitutes human authority for God’s 
sovereignty.”163 The exertion of power by a state is automatically suspect, as a government by the 
people, therefore, is understandably not ideal either.164 
In this respect, Noah Feldman points out that “[h]istorically, what made Islamic 
government distinctive was a constitutional order in which the implementation of the Shari’a was 
the nominal raison d’être of the state and the prime way of legitimating its use of force. Islamic 
law, understood to comprehend both the classical constitutional order and the legal order that 
obtained under it, structured private legal relations as well as relations between state and 
citizen.”165 The best government for a Muslim country, therefore, is the one people view as 
upholding Islamic law on the citizen-citizen level.166 In other words, an ideal Muslim government 
is one that gives the impression of enforcing God’s sovereignty rather than being a product of 
human authority.167 If God’s law regulates primarily person-person interactions and community 
relations, then for the government to go beyond that would be inherently suspect.  
Bernard Lewis notes that “Muslim law has never conceded absolute power to the 
sovereign, nor, with few exceptions, have Muslim sovereigns ever been able to exercise such 
power for any length of time.”168 This does not mean, however, that Islam views monarchy or 
dictatorship negatively, or democracy positively, or vice versa; however, the idea of mulk is 
generally negative. That is, the best government for a Muslim society would not be a government 
that imposes its own will on the people, but neither would it be a government that imposes the 
peoples’ will on the people. Rather, the best government is one that places primacy of authority in 
Muslim law.169 That is the theoretical ideal anyway, and the ideal finds its truest form in the form 
 
160ABOU EL FADL, supra note 103, at 4 (“For Islam, democracy poses a formidable challenge. Muslim jurists argued 
that law made by a sovereign monarch is illegitimate because it substitutes human authority for God’s sovereignty. 
But law made by sovereign citizens faces the same problem of legitimacy. In Islam, God is the only sovereign and 
ultimate source of legitimate law. How, then, can a democratic conception of the people’s authority be reconciled with 
an Islamic understanding of God’s authority?”). 
161Id. 
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163Id. at 19 (“An essential characteristic of a legitimate Islamic government is that it is subject to and limited by 
Shari‘ah law. Although this concept does offer support for the rule of law, we must distinguish between the supremacy 
of law and the supremacy of a set of legal rules.”). 
164Id. at 12 (“The two are quite distinct, and both are suggested in the Islamic legal tradition. Once again, Islamic 
political thought contains a range of interpretive possibilities. […], some of those possibilities resonate more strongly 
with democratic principles.”). 
165 FELDMAN, supra note 88, at 116. 
166 H.A. Hellyer & Nathan J. Brown, Leading from Everywhere: The History of Centralized Islamic Religious 
Authority, FOREIGN AFF. (June 15, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-15/leading-everywhere  
[https://perma.cc/687J-WH5U] (“It is well-known that there is no overarching state or non-state body, such as a church 
or set of religious figures, that interprets and imposes one set of Islamic teachings. That is, there is also no formal 
institution like the Vatican or other ecclesiastical body for Muslims.”). 
167ABOU EL FADL, supra note 103.  
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 BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 31 (1988). 
169See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents under Islamic Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L. J. 349, 371 (1996) 
(discussing the difference between the importance of individualism in Western culture and the emphasis on community 
welfare in Islamic societies). 
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of the Caliphate. Understanding what a Caliphate is, as a form of government, is informative in 
understanding the relationship between Islam and democracy. The defining characteristic is not, 
as many may believe, government based on a radical application of the Shari’a legal system.170 
What distinguishes a Caliphate is its particular model of limited governance. “To be Caliph 
in reality means acting as substitute for the Lawgiver ([Prophet] Mohammed) with regard to the 
preservation of the religion and the political leadership of the world.”171 To be clear, the Caliph 
was not a lawgiver in the simple sense, “his legislative authority was limited [or almost denied 
entirely, as his role was executive]. . . . The [C]aliph’s main responsibilities (as the institution 
developed, at any rate) lay in the enforcement of Islamic law.”172 The Caliph “was concerned . . . 
with religion in his capacity as the person commanded to transmit the duties imposed by the 
religious laws to the people and to cause them to act in accordance with them, and with worldly 
political leadership in his capacity as the person in charge of the (public) interests of human 
civilization.”173 
Trying to conform the idea of the Caliphate into a modern system of government presents 
challenges. The Caliphate does not seem to fit into the traditional models of executive, legislature, 
and judiciary.174 The Caliph seems to have the powers of all three, but wields none of them from 
a metaphysical perspective.175 That is, the Caliph is meant to enforce the law, not make it. It is 
unclear that a particular characteristic of any system of modern governance is inherently 
incompatible with the Caliphate ideal.176 While metaphysically the Caliph carries out none of the 
traditional functions of government, in the physical reality, the Caliph ultimately combines the 
three governmental functions into one.177 This is something that modern governments of Muslim 
countries can and often do use to their advantage, and, if true, it is a compelling explanation for 
the politics of the Muslim world over the past few decades.178 
If, in theory, the ideal Muslim government is a Caliphate with a Caliph whose role is limited 
to enforcing Islamic law, then in practice, any government will find success that can successfully 
convince its people that it is, in fact, so limited.179 This means that no system of government, 
whether dictatorship or democracy, is more compatible to a Muslim society than any other. At the 
same time, neither autocracy nor democracy are favorable systems of government if either of them 
 
170 See Sherman A. Jackson, Shari‘ah, Democracy, and the Modern Nation State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular 
Rule, and Pluralism, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 88, 94-95 (2003) (discussing the role of Islamic jurists’ interpretive 
authority when deciding issues under Islamic law and asserting that Islamic law is not necessarily at odds with notions 
of democratic governance). 
171 Robert J. Delahunty, An Epitaph for ISIS? The Idea of a Caliphate and the Westphalian Order, 35 ARIZ. J. INTL. 
& COMP. L. 1, 46-47 (2018) (quoting Ibn Khaldun, THE MUQADIMMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY 171 (Franz 
Rosenthal trans., N.J. Dawood abr. ed. 1967). 
172 Id. at 47-48.  
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174 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 4, 7 (2003) 
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in Islamic Legal History, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 103 (2001). 
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178 See generally Frederick Denny, Ummah in the Constitution of Medina, 36 J. NEAR E. STUD. 39 (1977); Moshe Gil, 
The Constitution of Medina: A Reconsideration, 4 ISR ORIENTAL STUD. 44 (1974). 
179 Bernard Botiveau, Contemporary Reinterpretations of Islamic Law: The Case of Egypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC: 
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are viewed as being in opposition to Islamic law.180 It should be noted that “[a]bsent an 
institutionalized understanding of what Islamic law stands for,” rulers in countries like Egypt have 
found that generic “calls for ‘codification of Islamic law’. . . easily gain public support.”181 
None of these answer the question of why monarchies and dictatorships rule the majority 
of the Muslim world. If indeed the Caliph’s role was as an enforcer of the law, then one would 
think that the clearest manifestation of that ideal would be not in the strong executives we see in 
the Muslim world today, but in strong judiciaries.182 This likely motivates the hypothesis that in 
Egypt, for instance, the best chance at bringing Islamic law into the age of democracy lies with the 
country’s judicial branch “because of the classical portrayal in Muslim literature of the judge as a 
person who has knowledge and practices Ijtihad.”183 It should be noted, however, that even the 
judiciary is limited by the government it is associated with: “Egyptian judges are restricted by the 
limited intellectual proposals and unlimited public skepticism towards governmental interference 
into the judiciary. Overall, without enough public support, one may question the future 
applicability of these choices.” 184 Muslim societies may indeed be more favorable to judges than 
executives and legislatures, but association with the state can tarnish the entire system’s 
legitimacy. 
In short, theoretical compatibility does not mean practical favorability. The culprit is that 
some legal scholars astonishingly gloss over in their discussion of Egypt: Not just Egypt, but across 
the Muslim and Middle Eastern world, there is “no institutionalized understanding of what Islamic 
law stands for.”185 Going back to the above discussion of Schmitter and Karl, it becomes clear 
why Muslim countries have, for decades, been marred by dictatorships, violence, and religious 
radicalism, all to the detriment of democracy.186 Without an institutionalized understanding of 
what Islamic law stands for, anyone is free to assert their own understanding. Despots like Nasser 
or Al-Sadat, among others in the region, were free to attack places and call it a jihad, and ISIS was 
free to attempt a total overthrow of Syria and Iraq and declare a Caliphate, regardless of whether 
the dictators were really just trying to consolidate power or whether ISIS represented “rule of law 
and limited government.”187 
 
C. The Paradox (?) of Islam and Democracy 
Democracy requires the society to understand precisely what Islamic law stands for. 
Really, a common understanding on this point reflects a strong civil society, which is the real 
prerequisite for democracy. The primary reason for this is that democracy, especially in its early 
days, is an inherently weak institution. A strong civil society is one that is “able to act 
 
180 See Timothy D. Sisk, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 38-39 
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independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.”188 Only in a 
strong civil society can “elected officials . . . exercise their constitutional powers without being 
subjected to overriding opposition from unelected officials.”189 Unfortunately, as noted, Arab 
countries today “all share one critical deficit to any democracy—a fragile civil society.”190 How 
could this be? 
Paradoxically, the culprit may be the very thing legal scholars insist is “key to Islamic 
Democracy.”191 Legal thinkers note, “[t]he structure and goals of Ijtihad institutions in general 
gave rise to a growing civil society that ‘does not depend on the presence of sovereign and free 
individuals, but on groups or communities and their institutions enjoying a significant degree of 
autonomy from the state.’”192 Such a civil society is not necessarily one that would promote 
democracy. Democracy, perhaps, is a promising system for structuring and protecting the civil 
liberties needed to allow for autonomy from the state, but democracy also requires active 
engagement and participation, which necessarily entails a limitation in just how much autonomy 
communities can enjoy over the long term.193 Moreover, the participatory aspect of democracy 
necessarily means that the body politic is the source both of law and of the legitimacy of law.194 
 It should be noted that “limited government” does not flow naturally from “autonomy from 
the state.”195 To conflate the two would be to confuse government whose “jurisdiction is limited 
to certain enumerated objects, which concern all [citizens]” and government whose jurisdiction is 
ultimately subordinate to some other entity.196 An Islamic culture descendent from Ijtihad 
institutions that promote autonomy from the state will naturally yield a weak civil society because 
the body politic will be adverse to national politics.197 The reason for this is simple.  “[T]he 
structure and goals of Ijtihad institutions in general gave rise to a growing civil society that ‘does 
not depend on the presence of sovereign and free individuals, but on groups or communities and 
their institutions enjoying a significant degree of autonomy from the state.’”198 Bear in mind that 
this describes local religious authorities.199 As explained, Schmitter and Karl’s conditions for 
democracy require that the religious establishment cannot wield independent power over the state. 
Separating mosque and state is one aspect of this, but ultimately if people listen to their religious 
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IV. Conclusion: The Islamic Paradox and the History of Our Time: 
Is It the Fear of The Modern World? 
 
Must Islam, or its clerics, be repressed for democracy to thrive? Not at all. Muslims already 
“separate law and government.” In theory, democracy can find success in Muslim countries if the 
government can convince the people, or at least the clergy, that it is the best form of government 
for reliably carrying out Shari’a. But then, what is the relationship between Islam and democracy, 
if not one of adversity? Perhaps, it is one of relative indifference. Perhaps, Islam is most compatible 
with whatever form of government the body politic believes upholds the principles of Islam. At 
the moment, democracy is affiliated with Western, non-Muslim countries.  
Even worse, those Western countries are increasingly being seen as anti-Muslim. As long 
as Middle East populations view democracy in this way, its popularity will never rise to the level 
necessary for a successful future Arab Spring. Unfortunately, the fact that Morsi’s blunder was 
enough to end democracy in Egypt says more about the Egyptian people than its military. 
Likewise, the fact that the Syrian revolution was derailed by the rise of da‘esh (ISIS) unfortunately 
means that democracy must answer to the politics of the broader Middle East, rather than of 
individual countries. If the events of the past decade are any indication of the future of democracy 
in the Muslim world, that future is bright, but the end is not near. Democracy will come slowly 
where it does come. Where monarchy and dictatorship currently have a strong foothold, that 
foothold will remain strong so long as autocratic leaders can continue to convince their faithful 
citizens that they are enforcers of the Shari’a, rather than autocrats making their own law. 
Starting from within the Islamic political thought, in sum, our argument rests upon the fact 
that shūrà and ijmā‘ could be understood not as representative but as participatory democracy. 
First, the experience of the Prophet’s Medinese state must be reconsidered. In that society, shūrà 
was tantamount democracy as far as the Prophet was neither a king nor a pope.201 Decisional 
processes were debated between the Prophet and the companions. The former suggested solutions; 
the latter paid their allegiance on the basis of a shared strategy.202 This is commonly viewed in the 
battles and the wars of the Prophet (Badr; the Trench but also the “pact of Hudaybiyya”) when 
Muhammad was eager to hear the companions’ counsels, and is coherent with the famous hadith:  
 
“O Messenger of Allah! What should we do if, after your demise, we are confronted 
with a problem about which we find anything neither in the Qur’an nor have 
anything from you?” He replied: “Get together amongst my followers and place the 
matter before them for consultation. Do not make decisions on the opinions of any 
single person.”203 
 
Thus, shūrà is not “consultation” but participation into the decisional process—a sort of 
direct democracy.204 Furthermore, it is compelling to verify whether the concept of shūrà can pave 
the way to the realization of a democratic hegemony within the Arab-Islamic societies through the 
action of active political subjects. Being that Muslim civil society is weak and often oppressed by 
autocratical regimes, the directive role must be bestowed upon a renewed party which represents—
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in Gramsci’s terminology—a hegemonic force.205 The Modern Prince ought to realize the 
“intellectual and moral direction” of society as participation in collective decisional processes, is 
a token of democracy.206 Accordingly, ijmā‘ is not “consensus”—which can be extorted by force, 
for example through the mass-media or the control of political institutions—but collective will as 
in Gramsci’s attitude.207 This assertion assumes that the party is better than the movement and that 
Islamic movements ought to try to transform themselves into political parties. Islamization must 
be a process from below and not from above, and a party that practices hegemony is the best tool 
for realizing this aim.208 
Eventually, it would be possible to grant a positive character to the Islamic state. The 
concept of shūrà and ijmā‘ as a participative democracy is useful as far as the ethics of Islam 
couples with the rationality of the state. In doing so, we go beyond the dichotomy of Ibn Khaldūn 
between the mulk and the khilāfa—the rational but oppressive power and the ethical state of 
revelation.209 Shūrà as a participative democracy fosters the “multitude” as synthesis—on the 
footsteps of Antonio Negri and Michel Foucault—of conflicting subjectivities.210 Shūrà in this 
domain could represent an absolute democracy performing “the government of everybody for 
everybody but through all individuals.”211 
Given the new functionality and political operability of the concept of the Islamic state—
which involves not only radical movements but to a great extent the theoretical political 
elaboration of moderate Muslim intellectuals—it is opportune to consider some of its general 
features. In this regard, there comes to mind the thought of Antonio Gramsci, who pitched the 
diriment problem of hegemony. The political-social bloc between rulers and the ruled in the state 
implies a hegemonic discourse of ruling society.212 If to date this hegemonic discourse has seen 
the domination of one class over another (the bourgeoisie over the proletariat), it is now a question 
of identifying its articulations in a condition of (a) the collapse of ideologies and (b) the 
nonexistence of the opposition in classes.213 Although it is no longer sovereignty but 
governmentality (as shown by Foucault) that dominates, the hegemonic problem of the moral 
(intellectual) and political leadership of society is nevertheless still extant.214  
The Islamic state could be featured according to Gramsci’s analysis—in a negative sense—
as follows: (a) that the state, even in the broadest meaning of integral state (political state combined 
with civil society) remains an instrument of class domination; (b) that the ruling groups have to 
exercise a certain degree of hegemony within civil society so that the subordinate groups consent 
to their subordinate position; (c) the dominant and ruling groups produce, organize, and protect 
consensus, exercising their hegemony; and (d) that law is fundamentally a coercive instrument 
aimed at directing civil society towards social conformism.215 Foucault said, “[P]ower produces 
knowledge and through this knowledge governmentality is produced. i.e. the homogenization and 
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consensus of all the social actors in the system of power in force.”216 Thus, the issue of the state, 
as is essential in Gramsci, appears ingrained with that of civil society. The problem is to find an 
alternative. Gramsci spoke of the need by the subordinate class to produce counter-hegemony, i.e. 
to produce a historical bloc between popular intellectuals and the masses in order to produce a 
“hegemony of the proletariat.”217 Accordingly, how is the concept of the Islamic state situated 
within this categorization? In this respect, Sayed Khatab mentioned:  
 
As an Islamic state is not an end in itself but only a means that facilitates 
the ordinances of the law [sharī‘a] and manages the affairs of the people, [it is 
obvious that] the political ordinances of the sharī‘a do not prescribe a specific form 
to which an Islamic state must conform. Thus, there is not only one form of the 
Islamic state, but many, and it is for the Muslims of every period to discover the 
form most suitable to their needs. . . . As for the manner or the method of 
consultation [shūrà], no particular system or model has been specified, so its 
application is left to existing circumstances and needs. This consultation did not 
follow any established or formally defined system but left it to the Muslims to 
devise the best method or system of their age.218  
 
In this sense, the concept of class is replaced by the ecumenical concept of the ummah 
(community of believers) understood today as citizenship.219 The equality of all the believers is 
guaranteed by their being horizontally placed in front of God, who is the guarantor of justice and 
equity.220 Hegemony is reserved for the ‘ulamā’. This position is, however, full of danger as far as 
the people could be expropriated by the ‘ulamā’ of their rights of sovereignty.221 Another risk is 
that of the charismatic rule of society; the emergence of a populist or demagogic leader. Consensus 
is delivered through the shūrà or consultation and can take either the form of a parliamentary 
government or the form of direct democracy through the annulment of the intermediate 
superstructures. (In a certain sense, this is the meaning of Gheddafi’s political experiment). Two 
Gramscian categories should be resumed and re-evaluated in relation to the shūrà: collective will 
(embodied in the party) and participatory democracy (in Gramsci the factory councils 
hegemonized by the workers’ organizations and the trade-unions).222 
A central role is reserved for the Shari’a. However, what is important is to decide which 
law is in question and how to articulate it.223 In the more discerning elaborations, such as by the 
well-known ‘Abdullahi al-Na‘īm, or Khaled Abou el-Fadl, or even Tariq Ramadan, the Shari’a 
keeps its etymological value of “way” (i.e. of a founding reference of the normative system) but 
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loses its regulatory nature,  as laws are elaborated by humans to meet contingent human needs.224 
The Shari’a is the cornerstone upon which the state is built, but it must be understood as a way and 
a path not as a normative system; Shari’a is the ideal foundation, not the practical realization.225 
Rather, the normative system is the outcome of human activity, not of divine intervention, although 
revelation, the Qur’an and sunna, are the compulsory references of the legal, social, and political 
praxis.226  
Going back to the initial question posed in the introduction of this piece, What is the most 
“true” Islam? The important point is not to pick a specific version and declare it representative of 
the entire religion, but rather to simply make sure it is coming from a place of knowledge and 
understanding of the complexity behind the legal history. The answer is that the “true” Islam is 
one that is similar to Judaism; it is a complex legal code developed over hundreds of years in order 
to provide individuals with a structured way to justly live life.  
Why hasn’t democracy had an easier time in the Muslim world? This question, posed at 
the start of this article, has a disappointing answer. Democracy is no more favorable than anything 
else that is not a Caliphate. In other words, democracy has not had an easier time because it is not 
necessarily more compelling to religious Muslims than the current system, so long as that system 
preserves local autonomy and communities that otherwise govern themselves according to the 
principles of Shari’a. Those content with the government they have will not fight for something 
else. Moreover, with the Caliphate being the ideal system in theory, those most likely to fight (i.e. 
young energetic men or youth) do not necessarily view democracy as the system worth fighting 
for,  if the fight is for a system more friendly to Islam. Finally, and we suspect this will occur on 
its own, we think the increasing population of moderate Muslims in Western countries should be 
encouraged because it will breed understanding. Many times, it is easier to hate or dislike a religion 
or a group of people from afar, but harder to do when you are friends or co-workers with those 
same people. 
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